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Abstract  
The Clean  Development Mechanism (CDM), established by the Kyoto protocol, can 
generate substantial rents fo r proje ct par ticipants via the sale of  Certif ied Em ission 
Reductions. For this reason, supposedly technical decisions about the approval of CDM 
methodologies and about the registration of projects may be driven by benefits to specific 
countries or interest groups. Our econom etric analysis of data for about 250 
methodologies and about 1000 projects discussed by the CDM Executive Board (EB) so 
far, suggests that indeed, along with formal quality criteria, political-economic variables 
determine the final EB decision.  
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1. Introduction 
The CDM Executive Board (EB) is an institution defined by the Kyoto Protocol to the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Its 20 members and alternates 
are elected by the UNFCCC Conference of the Parties and meet about once a month to 
register individual projects to be carried out in the framework of the Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM). Moreover, EB m embers are responsible for the approval of 
methodologies used to  assess th e “additionality” of current and future projects and to 
calculate as well as monitor their emission reductions. As defined by the Conference of 
the Parties (UNFCCC 2002), “a project activity is additional, if anthropogenic emissions 
of greenhouse gases by sources are reduced below those that would have occurred in the 
absence of the registered CDM project activity”. 
As the CDM allows industrialized count ries to receive Certified Em ission 
Reductions (CERs) from projects in developing countries, the assessment of additionality 
is vital to determine whether emission reductions through these projects would not have 
happened without th e CDM as well. The approval of non-addition al projects leads to  
benefits for the investor in the industrialized and/or in the developing country concerned 
(depending on resource flows agreed between these partners), to the detriment of global 
protection against clim ate ch ange. We ask whether th is c onflict b etween glob al a nd 
country specific benefits (i.e., greenhouse gas mitigation versus revenues from CER sales) 
becomes visible in terms of the registration of projects and the approval of methodologies 
by the EB.  
To assess this question, we draw upon the Public Choice literature on international 
organizations, as initially developed by Frey (1984, 1997), Vaubel (1986, 2006), and 
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Vaubel and Willett (1991), which is in turn related to more general questions of collective 
action (Sandler 1992, 2001). On the basis of these early work s, a large literature has 
developed in recen t years, and the role of special in terests has b een analyzed in th e 
context of many international organizations, most prominently the IMF and the World 
Bank. Usually, this role is found to be substantial. For example, several authors find that 
the membership of a developing country on the UN security council not only significantly 
increases the aid flows it receives from the U.S., but also the credits it receives from the 
IMF and World Bank (Kuziemko and Werker 2006; Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 2009a, 
2009b). These effects appear to be driven  by som e sort of vote buying. Sim ilarly, 
membership on the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors is found to approximately 
double funding from the IBRD (Kaja and Werker 2009). However, Public Choice analysis 
of environmental decision making is so far largely restricted to the national level. In their 
comprehensive review of studies on the pol itical economy of environmental policies, 
Oates and Portney (2003) find that both social welfare and interest-related variables have 
an impact on regulatory outcomes.  
With rising concerns about clim ate ch ange, the general l iterature on global 
greenhouse gas mitigation has also expanded dramatically. The UNFCCC, as the major 
policy regime covering the current Kyoto Protocol as well as its successor after 2012 has, 
however, been largely neglected by academics. This is true especially when it comes to 
empirical e vidence on its inte rnal f unctioning. From  a pr actical p erspective, m ore 
knowledge m ight help to design more effec tive clim ate policy treaties in the future. 
Theoretically, it is of interest whether the results from the existing literature carry over to 
this newly established and unique institution.  
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Based on nearly 1000 projects and 250 methodologies discussed by the EB until 
October 2007, we ask what determines EB decision making. More specifically, we want 
to assess w hether pu rely technical aspect s of the em ission reduction of projects or 
methodologies dominate, or whether member countries’ special interests (including the 
interests of lobbies within these countries) have any major influence, too. We therefore 
closely examine the relevance of recommendations by specialized technical committees 
on the one hand, and the role of EB members’ nationality and other strategic or interest-
related variables on the other hand. The latter  include the role of the W orld Bank as a 
major participant in the CDM business, the impact of change over time due to increasing 
numbers of m ethodologies and projects, and the degree of transparency of the EB 
decision-making process. 
In Section 2, our theoretical ideas will be outlined in more detail. This will allow 
us to m otivate our hypotheses.  Section 3 then discusses the data and the estim ation 
strategy we use for our econom etric analysis . Section 4 presents the results. F inally, 
Section 5 derives first conclusions a nd policy recommendations for the further 
institutional development of the UNFCCC Secretariat and its CDM Executive Board. 
2. Determinants of EB decision making: A brief 
theoretical foundation 
2.1 Decision making in boards of international organizations and in national 
environmental bureaucracies 
Recent studies have shown that membership on boards of international organizations can 
yield more favorable outcomes for the countries represented. Kaja and Werker (2009) find 
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that membership on the World Bank’s board of governors significantly increases funding 
by the IBRD. Even though the UNFCCC and the World Bank differ strongly in terms of 
setup and organization, we focus on potential similarities here. Decisions on funding by 
the IBRD and decisions by the EB on the CDM are related in that both involve significant 
monetary flows to developing countries. In this paper, we want to exa mine whethe r 
membership on the EB significantly increases CDM acceptance rates.  
As mentioned earlier, similar evidence exists for other international organizations. 
Membership on the UN Security Council increases aid flows from the US (Kuziemko and 
Werker 2006) and credits from the World Bank and the IMF (Dreher, Sturm and Vreeland 
2009a, 2009b). Apart from the simple effect of country membership in the Council, this 
also suggests the existence of wider political  effects that extend to  other international 
organizations. In our context, we may find interrelations between the EB and the World 
Bank. In particular, we will investig ate whether the W orld Bank, as the predom inant 
international player in the CDM market outside the UNFCCC, can m ake use of its 
lobbying expertise in influencing the EB’s decisions.  
The liter ature discussed  so f ar is re lated to  the  EB in ter ms of  decis ions o n 
financial flows to developing countries made by international organizations. Turning the 
focus away from the financial flows and more to the environmental good characteristic of 
the CDM, we lay out som e possible sim ilarities with decision m aking by national 
bureaucracies on environmental issues.  
Cropper et al. (1992) investigate the determinants of US EPA decision making on 
pesticide regulation. They find that risks to  the environm ent and health increased the 
probability that the pesticide was forbidden. At the same time, larger benefits associated 
with the use  of  a pesticide and comm ents by grower associations on the need for it 
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reduced this probability. Hird (1990) finds that the regional background of members on 
the congressional committee responsible for site cleanups only marginally influences the 
distribution of related funding. The main determinant of site cleanups seems to be their 
risk. Oates and Portney (2003) summ arize these findings in the following w ay: 
Bureaucrats can be conceived as maximizing a weighted utility function of both social 
benefits and benefits that accrue to specifi c interest groups. We intend to extend this 
analysis to bureaucratic decision making in the framework of international agreements on 
global pollutants.  
Studying the determ inants of EB d ecision making can hence expand the 
knowledge of bureaucratic decisions on environmental issues to the international sphere 
and, more specifically, to committee membership in international organizations.  
2.2 Decision making on the EB 
According to the rules of the Kyoto Protocol, a CDM project may be accepted only if it 
generates e mission reductions which are “add itional” to r eductions th at would have 
happened without the CDM. For instance, if the investment in the replacement of an old 
power plant leads to higher energy efficiency and reduced emissions, this project does not 
automatically qualify for the CDM. If the replacement is economically attractive for mere 
efficiency reasons, the investment will take place without the CDM, and no CERs should 
be issued for it. However, any investor planning such a project has an obvious incentive in 
trying to argue that it is additional, b ecause the CERs potentially generated can have a 
considerable financial value for him. For example, a wind power plant with an investment 
cost of 100 million € in a m oderately attractive wind regim e could ann ually generate 
CERs of a value of six million €. In extreme cases (e.g., industrial gas projects), the value 
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of CERs generated in a single year can even be a multiple of the initial investment cost. 
Thus, there is reason to believe that inve stors and other stakeh olders are strongly 
interested in influencing EB decision makingi.  
While we argue for stakeholder interest , it m ay not yet be clear how this can 
effectively influence EB decision m aking. Following the rational choice approach 
employed by Frey (1984) and Vaubel (1991), we first define the relevant actors and then 
discuss plausible assumptions about their preferences, i.e., about the utility these actors 
derive from different decisions they might take. More specifically, we rely on Oates and 
Portney (2003) in imagining that EB members maximize a weighted utility function of 
both costs and benefits that accrue solely to their national constituencies, and costs and 
benefits that accrue globally, i.e., via climate change and mitigation. While non-additional 
CDM projects certainly lead to benefits for stakeholders in host and buyer countries, they 
can be regarded as a cost with respect to global greenhouse gas mitigation. Let us now 
consider the national stakeholder interests in more detail. 
These interests m ay arise in different  countries: the host countries, usually 
developing countries, but also including in dividual high-income countries like South 
Korea, and the buyer countries, which are industrialized countries with emission reduction 
targets as defined in Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol (Annex-B countries). The actual 
investor may be a national or international firm or a public institution. The project may be 
developed in the host country alone (unilateral CDM) or result from cooperation between 
a host and a buyer country investor. 
If a project is registered by the EB and becomes operational, it generates CERs. In 
case of unilateral CDM the CERs c an be sold by the host country investor at m arket 
prices, as no buyer country is directly involved in the project investment. Otherwise, the 
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benefits arising from  the CERs are shar ed between the host and the buyer country 
investors, whereby the shares depend upon the negotiation power of each party. The buyer 
country investor can then either also sell his part of the CERs on the market or use it to 
compensate his domestic emissions. In the case of bilateral CDM, the host country can 
also benefit from technology transfer.  
The above discussion shows that bot h private investor s and governm ents 
themselves may have an interest in their CDM projects being approved. As private firms 
cannot directly influence policy making at the international level, we assume that they will 
lobby their governments for support. In line with what is known on decision making in a 
possibly comparable international organization like the World Bank (Kaja and W erker 
2009), we expect that countries directly represented am ong the ten mem bers or ten 
alternates of the EB have a higher chance of influencing decision making in favor of their 
governments and private investors. While only the members have a formal right to voteii, 
decisions are usually based on a consensus, so that alternates, who have the same right to 
participate in the debate, can be assumed to be similarly influential. Hence, we expect that 
EB decisions tend to favor projects and met hodologies relevant for public and private 
investors in countries of EB members or alternates. 
Moreover, not only investors can benefit from the CDM. In the last few years, the 
CDM has a lso becom e an i mportant busine ss for various kinds of consultancy and 
auditing services. There are consultancy services required for the development of project 
documentation, which is then to  be audited (“validated”) before a project m ay even 
request registration from the EB. Consultancy services are also required for the design of 
CDM m ethodologies. The organiza tions involved in this business are often private 
consultancy firms for which the success of getting a major project registered or of getting 
 8
a methodology approved may be crucial for acquiring new orders in the future. We can 
therefore expect that these consultancies – just as private investors directly involved in 
CDM projects – will lobby thei r governments to ensure the success of their proposals. 
Therefore, we expect that if a consultant’s country is an EB member, methodologies and 
projects are more likely to be accepted.  
Finally, international organizations b ecome involved in the process. They 
frequently act as an intermediate buyer pooling CDM projects to establish funds, with the 
resulting CERs equally benefiting all the m embers of the fund. The pioneer and m ost 
well-known example is the Prototype Carbon Fund (PCF) of the World Bank, operational 
since April 2000. The World Bank has opened up ten other funds since then (World Bank 
2007, pp. 4-5). For the World Bank, this field represents a challenging new area of 
diversification. Of course, just as governm ents and private investors, the Bank is 
interested in positive EB decisions for its projects. First, it has to defend its image of a 
highly professional think tank in all areas of  international development. And second, it 
might not be able to obtain subscriptions fo r new funds if projects  in the portfolio of 
existing funds face difficulties in the registration process.  
Moreover, international organizations co mpete with priva te consultan cies in 
designing CDM methodologies. Again, the World Bank is at the forefront of activities in 
the area, and the stakes in favorable EB decisions on its methodologies are at least as high 
as for individual projects. Apart from the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank is 
involved in several CDM activities but only to a limited extent. 
While international organizations are never directly represented by an EB member 
country, they may indirectly influence EB decisions. First, the methodologies and projects 
they develop are generally relevant for a number of countries, some of which will almost 
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certainly be represented in the EB. Second, especially the World Bank as the predominant 
international organization involved in the field is present everywhere in the debates and 
has strong information and lobbying power. Finally, they may use networks within the 
international bureaucracies to  reinforce their positions. It follows that if international 
organizations, i.e., the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, are involved in the 
CDM process, methodologies and projects are more likely to be accepted. 
In general, for most of the actors described above one might expect the interest in 
having methodologies passed to be even higher than the interest in the registration of 
individual projects. The reason is that there are fewer methodologies, and that each of the 
methodologies predetermines the CDM potential of a whole group of individual projects. 
At the same time, the stakes of individual countries in a given methodology depend on the 
geographical spread of the relevant technology. A m ethodology for hydro power, for 
instance, will be applicable in many countries, so that many countries will be similarly 
interested. A methodology for N2O reduction from adipic acid production, however, can 
be used only in China, South Korea, and Brazil because other countries do not apply this 
technology. The approval of m ethodologies relevant to technologies only in a s mall 
number of countries may benefit some countries (and / or their investors) to the detriment 
of others – as it can a ttract investment which substitutes for investment elsewhere. We 
therefore expect debates about this type of methodologies to be the most highly politicized, 
i.e., for these methodologies, EB membership should be particularly relevant.  
We also ex pect som e differences in the political in terest in  different type of 
projects. Here, however, interest can be assumed to simply depend upon project size. For 
small projects, even the official texts provi de f or a diff erent trea tment with f aster 
procedures and fewer restrict ions concerning project evaluation. Depending on project 
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type, small projects have to meet one of the following thresholds: (i) renewable energy: 
<15 MW; (ii) energy efficiency: <60GWh (before December 2006: <15GWh); (iii) all 
other projects: <60 000 CERs (before December 2006: project emissions < 15 000 t CO2-
equivalent). We therefore expect higher chances of small projects being registered.  
In contrast to other international organizations where the overriding dominance of 
individual member states is a frequently analyzed topic (see e.g., Fleck and Kilby 2006 for 
the World Bank or Barrow and Lee 2005 for the IMF), voting power is distributed equally 
over all m embers in the EB. Nevertheless, th ere could be differences in the effective 
influence an individual EB member may be able to exert. This influence may be related to 
the overall importance of a country which can raise its negotiating power (e.g., through 
informally linking up  the issue at s take with cooperation or pressure  in other fields). 
Moreover, it may be related to different levels of effort linked to a different strength of 
incentives. While all countries can benefit from the CDM, the potential for such benefits 
may be quit e different. For instance, rela tively more advanced developing countries, 
which are generally attractive for foreign direct investment (FDI), are usually also more 
attractive as host countries for the CDM (Michaelowa and Michaelowa 2007). On the 
buyer country side, it could be  relevant which obligations  for em ission reductions the  
countries took up under the Kyoto Protocol and to what extent economic, technical and 
political constraints hinder them to meet these obligations domestically. Moreover, it may 
be relevant whether a country already has a strong position in FDI, which could enhance 
the potential interest for the CDM. 
Similarly, even countries not represented in the EB may have higher chances to get 
their projects and methodologies adopted if they are generally powerful players, and if 
there is a high incentive for them to engage in influencing the decision-making process. 
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Hence, for countries for which the CDM has a high potential, and for countries which are 
generally powerful players, we expect higher chances of methodology approval and 
project registration.  
Turning our attention to the actual decision-making process of the EB, it may be 
worthwhile to note certain differences between project regi stration and m ethodology 
approval. As outlined already, the evaluation of  whether a methodology is adequate to 
correctly calculate emission reductions and properly assess additionality, and whether a 
specific project meets these requirements, demands important technical knowledge which 
cannot be expected from  EB m embers wh o are usually delegated from  national 
bureaucracies. Special committees of researchers and other experts are therefore set in 
place to an alyze these technical qu estions. The responsib le technical comm ittee for 
methodologies is the Methodology Panel (Meth Panel); for individual projects, it is the 
Registration and Issuance Team (RIT). Formally, both bodies have no decision-making 
power; all decisions are taken by the EB . W hile Meth Pa nel r ecommendations ar e 
reported in openly accessible minutes of the meeting, there is no transparency about RIT 
recommendations. In addition, positions on individual projects are exchanged in the EB 
behind closed doors despite the general rule that EB meetings should be public (UNFCCC 
2006: p.38, Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex I, rules 26 and 27).  
In general, the extent to which EB members will favor political-economic over 
technical or scientific quality considerations must be expected to depend upon the above-
described institu tional setting of  the d ecision-making process.  In  particu lar, the  
transparency of the proce ss appears to be an im portant variable here. Many non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) have ta ken a critical stan ce towards the CDM  
because they fear that CERs will be generated for projects that are neither additional nor 
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sustainable (WWF 2007: p. 2; CDM W atch 2005). Clearly, under such conditions , a 
divergence between EB decision making and the technical advice of the relevant advisory 
committees will be closely scrutinized and may give raise to protests which could harm 
the image of the EB and the CDM as a whole. Obviously, NGO interventions are much 
easier when the information on both technical advice and EB decision making are openly 
available. Given the political cost of criticism, we may thus expect that interest related 
determinants of EB decision making - as opposed to technical or scientific considerations 
- will be stronger for decisions on projects than for decisions on methodologies.  
Finally, it appears plausible to assume that it is in the joint interest of all actors 
potentially benefiting from the CDM to show that the mechanism works. Policy makers 
may also wish to show this, for the simple reason that they have taken a positive decision 
on the introduction of this market mechanism in the first place – a decision which would 
otherwise be considered by the general public as a failure. In order to show that the  
mechanism works in the first place, a certain volume of CDM activities is required, i.e., 
sufficient demand for CDM projects must be generated, and a relevant number of projects 
have to become operational. In the initial years, this may lead to a rather mild scrutiny of 
methodologies and projects submitted for registration. At the same time, in the long run, a 
decision-making body cannot always let everything pass if it wants to be taken seriously 
by any outside observer. In addition, the CDM m ay be rejected as a whole if the 
assessment procedure is deemed to be unreliable. Therefore, the selection process can be 
expected to become stricter over time. 
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3. Data and estimation methods 
We assembled a dataset based on data fr om the UNEP Risoe Center (URC 2007) to 
empirically test our hypotheses. Our data contains qualitative information on the type and 
status of all projects and methodologies available on the CDM website of the UNFCCC 
on October 31, 2007. As we are interested in the determinants of EB decision making, we 
select only those cases where the status indicates that some EB decision has already been 
taken. This includes a total of 985 proj ects and 239 m ethodologies (including 31 
afforestation and reforestation methods).  
For these projects and CDM m ethodologies, the original UNEP Risoe Center 
dataset contains inform ation on the host and (in case of m ultilateral CDM) the buyer 
countries, the nam es of the relevant consul tancies or internati onal organizations, the 
intermediate and final assessments of the EB, as well as the relevant dates for submission 
of and decisions on methodologies.  
We expanded this dataset in many ways. First, we looked up the EB decision date 
for projects from individual project desi gn docum ents (PDDs) availab le online (see 
UNFCCC 2007a). Then, we searched in the minutes of EB meetings (UNFCCC 2007b) 
for individual EB members and alternates in each year. Their nationality was then used to 
create dummy variables indicating host or buyer country representation in the EB. Using 
PDDs and relevant company websites, we also  determined the country of the relevant 
consultants and equally created a dummy indicating EB membership.  
Moreover, to capture the political re levance of a m ethodology, we created a 
categorical variable with ranges from 1 (applicability in all countries, i.e., low potential 
for political competition) to 5 (applicable only in a small number of countries, i.e., high 
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potential for political competition). Thus, the higher the value of the variable, the higher is 
the political relevance of the decision. 
Furthermore, we derived the gap betw een Annex B countries’ Kyoto em ission 
budgets and the projected emission levels during the commitment period. This variable 
indicates the expected need for CERs. For EU countries, it was based on forecasts by the 
European Environment Agency (2006), and for Canada and Japan on projections by the 
U.S. Department of Energy (2007) (only energy-related CO2 emissions). All remaining 
information was obtained through linear extrapolations based on UNFCCC inventory data 
for 2000-2005 (UNFCCC 2007c). 
In addition, we merged this data with additional country information on GDP, FDI, 
trade, CO2 emissions, and education from the World Bank’s (2006) World Development 
Indicators. All these variables are selected for the year 2000, which is the year just before 
CDM activities started in 2001, and therefore should be the year at which decision makers 
would orient themselves when considering th e power of a country or the relevance of 
CDM as a complement to FDI. As the variation of this data over the years 2000 to 2006 is 
negligible when compared to the cross-country variation relevant here, and as information 
on these variables is taken into account with a lag which may vary from one EB member 
to the other, we consider that it is misleading to seek additional precision by entering this 
information for individual years of EB decision making. Using only information for the 
year 2000 also allows us to  impute missing values with va lues for adjacent years. For 
tertiary education, for which information was missing for some developing countries even 
after this replacement procedure, additional linear imputations were made sequentially 
using secondary enrolment rates and GDP per capita. 
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The education variable might as well serve as proxy for the quality of projects and 
methodologies. As the RIT assessm ent is confidential and rem ains unpublished, an 
alternative quality control is particularly relevant in the context of projects, rather than 
methodologies. As discussed above, the Me th Panel assessm ent is available for 
methodologies, so that we can retrieve the relevant quality information from the individual 
meeting reports (UNFCCC 2007d).  
At the project level, considering host country education levels alone may be one 
option, but does not seem sufficient to control for project quality. As an alternative, we 
therefore derive a new quality indicator ba sed on a review of all 985 individual PDDs. 
Since one of the authors is himself a member of the RIT, he knows the standard criteria to 
be resp ected and carried  out th e res ults of  a ll R IT asse ssments him self. The cr iteria 
include the credibility of the additionality test implemented by the project, as well as the 
correctness of the application of the baseline and monitoring methodology. Based on the 
information available from the PDDs, we define a categoric al variable with categories 
from 1 (lowest quality) to 5 (highest quality) for each individual project. 
To control for the quality of m ethodologies, we dispose of two alternativ e 
measures: the initial Meth Panel reco mmendation and the final Meth Panel 
recommendation. The initial recomm endation corresponds to the first Meth Panel 
assessment prior to any discussion at the EB. If the following EB decision does not lead to 
a clear approval or rejection, the revised method is discussed in the Meth Panel again.  
The final Meth Panel recommendation is c oded as a binary variable taking the 
value of 1 (method recommended) and 0 (method not recommended). The initial Meth 
Panel recommendation is coded as a categorical variab le assigning 2 if an approval is  
recommended, 1 if changes are requested, and 0 if  a r ejection is  recomm ended 
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(corresponding to Meth Panel r ecommendation categories A,B,C) iii. The initial Meth  
Panel recommendation therefore allows us to discriminate among good, intermediate, and 
bad methodologies.  
We use a similar coding for our dependent variable, i.e., for EB decisions. Again, 
for methods we can distinguish three categories (immediately adopted: 2, adopted after 
revision: 1, rejected or withdrawn: 0). Alternatively, we define a simple binary variable 
with the two categories “adopted” (1) and “rejected or withdrawn” (0). For projects, the 
binary decision variable is coded in the same way. However, prior to the final decision 
there is a more deta iled distinction possible between intermediate categories reflecting 
requested or imposed reviews as well as corr ection requests. The scale of the variable 
ranges from 4 (project registered) to 0 (project rejected or withdrawn).  
The distribution of m ethodologies and projects into the different categories is 
presented in Table 1.  
< Insert table 1 about here> 
From Table 1 it becom es immediately apparent that decisions on methodologies have 
been stricter by far than decisions on individual projects. In fact, only 6% of all projects 
were rejected, whereas this was the case for 55% of the methodologies. 
The estimation procedure is predetermined by the type of our dependent variables. 
For multivariate regressions with the binary and the other categorical variables we use 
probit and ordered probit regressions respectively. We initially also estimated logit and 
ordered logit m odels, but tests on the f unctional form  indicated that the norm al 
distribution yields a better fit.  
We expect that observations on project s or methodologies of the same host 
countries may not be independent. Therefore, we explicitly take into account clusters at 
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the host country level. One might also expect other limitations to the usual independence 
assumption. For instance, projects by the same buyer or validated by the same auditors 
may not be fully independent. However, for theoretical reasons (e.g., related to national 
technology) we expect this problem  to be m ore relevant at the host country level. In 
addition, there is a large share of unilateral CDM for which buyer countries were not even 
defined when the EB decision was taken.  To avoid an overly complex m odeling 
framework with various overlapping clusters , we thus lim it our an alysis to th e 
consideration of potential correlations within host countries. 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. EB decisions on methodologies 
Let us first consider EB decision m aking with respect to CDM methodologies. Table 2 
presents our regression results. In Regre ssion 1, we use t he binary final Meth Panel 
recommendation to control for the m ethodologies’ quality. Note that the num ber of 
observations is lower for Regression 1 because for 20 methodologies no final Meth Panel 
recommendation has (yet) been m ade. This va riable is highly significant and, in fact, 
explains almost all of the variatio n in our outcome variable. Table 3 shows a cross-
tabulation of Meth Panel recommendations and EB decisions. This table dem onstrates 
that, indeed, in only three cases the two committees show divergent views. Apparently, 
the EB decision is closely linked to the final Meth Panel recommendation. This implies 
that hardly any other variable has enough explanatory power to become significant. Only 
the year of the EB decision shows a significantly negative coefficient, indicating that EB 
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decisions have become stricter over time. However, even this variable hardly adds any 
explanatory power to the overall model in Regression 1. 
Considering initial rather than final Meth Panel recommendations and taking into 
account intermediate values between a clear yes or no (Regressions 2-7), we find more 
differences between the assessments of the two committees. There are divergent views in 
26 cases, whereby the EB tends to be strict er than the M eth Panel ( more negative 
assessments in 19 out of 26 cases). 
Furthermore, looking more closely at EB m embership, we find a very high 
correlation (0.71) between EB membership of the host and of the buyer country. This 
makes it difficult to distinguish between the effects of hos t and buyer country EB 
membership in a regression model including both variables. Therefore, these variables are 
estimated separately first (Regressions 2-3, and 5-6). In Regressions 4 and 7, it is tested 
whether despite their high correlation it still possible to estimate their effects jointly. The 
two sets of Regressions 2-4, and 5-7 only differ by the additional inclusion of FDI as a 
measure of a host country’s CDM potential and buyer countries’ pr opensity to invest 
abroad.  
When we leave out buyer country EB membership and focus on host country EB 
membership alone (Regression 2) the coefficient indicates a significantly positive impact 
on methodology approval. Keeping all explanatory variables at their mean host country 
EB membership increases the predicted probability of a method to be approved by 22.6 
percentage points. This result suggests that indeed EB decisions tend to favor 
methodologies relevant for EB member countries. When we focus on buyer country EB 
membership alone in Regression 3, it fails (marginally) to be significant at the 10% level. 
Finally, trying to estimate both the impacts of host and buyer EB membership jointly in 
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Regression 4 increases the standard errors to such an extent that now even host country 
EB membership fails to be significant. Ho wever, as opposed to EB m embership of the 
buyer country, host country membership is still relatively close to significant at the 10% 
level and also seems to be more important considering the size of the effect.  
Moreover, we find significant coeffici ents for m ethodologies developed by 
international organizations (IO), i.e., predominantly the World Bank. The IO variable has 
the expec ted positive impact. IO participa tion incre ases th e predicted probability of  
approval by 32,8 percentage points – at the mean of all explanatory variables, including 
the given level of technical and scientific quality as measured by the initial Meth Panel 
recommendation. 
For consultants whose governments are represented in the EB, the coefficient is 
negative and does not show any significant impact. As opposed to our hypothesis, it does 
not seem to matter for consultancies whether their country has a seat in the EB.  
The results above are robust to the inclusion of additional host and buyer country 
variables. We ran estimations with different possible controls from a selection of macro 
variables indicating the economic power and the CDM potential of host and/or buyer 
countries. None of them becom es significant or changes the coefficients of the other 
variables in any relevant way. As an example, Regressions 5-7 presents the results after 
control for FDI. Neither FDI inflows into the host country nor FDI outflows from the 
buyer country have any significant effect on methodology approval. Coefficients of all  
other variables are almost identical to those in Regressions 2-4. 
<insert tables 2 and 3 about here> 
All in all, Table 2 shows mixed evidence of the impact of political-economic, i.e., 
interest-related variables on EB decisions on methodologies. We do find statistical and 
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economic positiv e im pacts of host country m embership in  the EB as well as of t he 
consultant being an international organization – at least as soon as we control for effective 
quality with the ini tial Meth Panel recomm endation. In line with our hypothesis, 
assessments become stricter over tim e. Nevertheless, the most dom inant explanatory 
variable is our control for the effective quality of the m ethodology as indicated by the 
Meth Panel recommendation. Using the final Meth Panel recommendation, we hardly find 
any other significant result. Only using the initial Meth Panel recommendation, do all of 
the above mentioned political-economic variables become significant. If we believe the 
results using the initial Meth Panel recommendation, both technical and interest-related 
variables are simultaneously relevant to explaining EB decisions. 
How can this difference between the im pact of the initial and the impact of the 
final Meth Panel recommendation on the overall regression result be explained? It is likely 
that final Meth Panel recommendations are not free from political considerations. Indeed, 
even though the Meth Panel is a body of expe rts, it is not fully fr ee from EB influence 
because the chair him self is an EB m ember, and there are  frequent co mplaints from 
independent Meth Panel m embers about this linkage. Therefore, especially when the 
initial Meth Panel decision is not definitive, effective lobbying might concentrate on the 
Meth Panel. In fact, to some extent, final Meth Panel recommendations could anticipate 
the final EB decisions. If this were the case, final Meth Panel recommendations as used in 
Regression 1 would be endogenous and hence misleading as a control.  
We dealt with this problem in various ways. First, we considered to instrument the 
quality of the methodology with host country tertiary education. However, the correlation 
between Meth Panel decisions and tertiary education was so low ( ρ=0.099) that we  
decided to abandon this approach. Second, we regressed the Meth Panel recommendation 
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itself on the different political-economic variables introduced in Table 2. While using the 
final Meth Panel recommendation as the de pendent variable leads to significant 
coefficients for most of these variables, this is not the case when using the initial Meth 
Panel recommendation. Hence, we consider that, as opposed to the final Meth Panel 
recommendation, the initial Meth Panel recommendation is a valid control variable for 
effective quality of methodologies. In turn, this substantiates the results of Regressions 2-
7.  
In our initial hypotheses, we had mentioned one more plausible effect which we 
have not discussed so far. This refers to  the political relevan ce of the m ethodology in 
terms of its applicability to different countries. This variable does not have any significant 
effect in our regressions, so that we did not introduce it into Table 2. However, it seems to 
be related to the question whether there is at all a divergenc e between the initial M eth 
Panel recommendations and the EB assessm ents. In this context, the dir ection of  the 
divergence does not seem to matter. Coding a sim ple dummy variable to indicate 
divergence and relating  it to ou r variable for political var iance in a b ivariate logistic 
regression framework yields a (weakly) si gnificant odds ratio of 1.82 (p-value=0.105, 
regression not reported here). This implies that the more limited the applicability of the 
methodology, i.e., the higher the competition effect and thus the political relevance, the 
higher the chances that some divergence of views arises in the first place. 
Finally, we checked the robustness of the positive impact of EB membership in 
two ways (regressions not reported here). First, we introduced linear country fixed effects 
for Regressions 2-7 to remove any unobserved heterogeneity on the country level using 
the Mundlack-Chamberlain approach (Wooldridge 2002: p.487-490). The effect of EB 
membership does not disappear. Second we tried to examine more directly whether the 
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effect of country membership might be confounded with the (unobserved) capacity of a 
country to develop sound CDM methodologies. To do so, we introduced variables for pre- 
and post- EB membership. If there were any stable latent variables that that would drive 
the results, pre- and/or post- EB membership should also be significant. We do not find 
any sign of significant pre- or post- EB membership. Hence, all in all, we are confident 
that no unobserved latent variables are driving the results.  
Summing up our discussion of decision making on methodologies, we can say that 
there is some relevance of political-economic, i.e., non-quality related, but interest-driven 
variables. T here is cle ar eviden ce that – co nditional o n the initia l Meth Pan el 
recommendation – host country EB membership as well as the World Bank influence have 
a positive impact on the approval of a m ethodology. Moreover, as expected, decisions 
have become stricter over time. At the same time, we do not find the expected effects for 
buyer country EB m embership or consultant  country EB mem bership. Moreover, EB 
decisions closely follow Meth Panel reco mmendations, indicating a strong effect of 
quality after all. In fact, most of the time EB members do not tend to decide in their own 
favor or in favor of the ir constituencies. Th ere is som e evidence for an effect of the 
political relevance of the methodology on whether or not there is a divergence of views 
between the Meth Panel and the EB. Moreover, methodologies for which the EB cannot 
find a clear decision imm ediately seem to be  the prime target of  lobbying activities. 
Especially in these cases, final Meth Panel decisions also appear to be affected by this  
lobbying influence.  
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4.2. EB decisions on individual projects 
We will now analyze EB decisions on individual projects, where the transparency of the 
decision-making process is more limited, and see how these deviate from decisions on 
methodologies. In particular, we note that there are only a small number of rejections as 
compared to methodologies. Only 5.8 % of a ll projects, for which a final decision had 
been taken until October 31, 2007, have been rejected.  
In fact, various explanatory variables related to EB membership cannot even be 
introduced into our m ultivariate regressions because there is no variance in outcom es. 
Thus, all 29 projects for which the World Bank was the credit buyer successfully achieved 
their registration. Similarly, in all 15 cases in which the host country was represented as 
an alternate EB member, the corresponding projects were registered. And finally, in all 7 
cases in which the va lidator’s government was represen ted in the EB, projects were 
registered, too.  
Moving beyond descriptive statistics we present the results of our more general 
econometric assessment in Table 4. Even though the rejection rate is relatively small, we 
stick to trad itional probit estim ations. An altern ative procedure could b e to explic itly 
consider our data as rare events data and to  carry out a case control study which 
introduces a selection on the dependent variable prior to estimation and tends to perform 
better in Monte Carlo simula tions (King and Zeng 2001). Howe ver, this procedure is 
generally suggested only for datasets in which one of the two occurrences is below 5% 
and in which the total number of observations is relatively small.  
One of the major econometric concerns is how to properly control for the effective 
quality of a project. Using host country tertiary enrolment rates as a proxy (Regression 8) 
does not show any significant relationship with EB decisi on making – a result which 
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leaves us with some doubts about the adequacy of this variable for this purpose, and thus 
about this regression specification as a whole. Measures of fit for the overall regression 
are very low, too. In all other regressions, we use the assessment of project quality in line 
with RIT criteria as described in Section 3. This variable is highly significant throughout 
all further models (Regressions 9 to 14) and considerably increases their fit. It seems to 
capture the actual effect of quality rather well. 
Host country EB m embership mostly shows the expected p ositive coefficient, 
which, however, becom es only significant in Regression 9 where buyer country EB 
membership is not considered. Just as in the case of m ethodologies, the estim ation 
problem here is a very high correlation between both membership variables (0.77). We 
therefore consider the effects again first individually and then combined.  
Buyer country EB membership turns out to be always positively significant. Its 
effect also rem ains unaffected by the simultaneous introducti on of  host country 
membership. The stronger factor in term s of EB membership, therefore, appears to b e 
membership of the buyer. Marginal efects displayed in Regressions 10 suggest that buyer 
country membership increases the predicted probability of a project to be registered by 
about 5.4 percentage points (evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables). This is a 
rather small effect in terms of its absolute value. The size of the effect is reduced even  
further when other host country variables are taken into account (see Regressions 13 and 
14).iv One should note, however, that the overall registration rates are very high. Hence, 
marginal effects (as well as the efects for the discrete change of the dummy variable from 
0 to 1) are estim ated to be fairly sm all, even though they are highly significant in 
statistical terms.  
<insert table 4 about here> 
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Our results on project registration confirm the earlier result for methodologies that 
EB decisions have become stricter over time. This result is highly significant across all 
regression specifications. Moreover, in Regressions 12 to 14, we find some evidence for 
the importance of variables indicating the economic relevance of the project – in general, 
as well as f or the host or buyer country indi vidually. With respect to project size, our 
hypothesis suggested that small projects would not lead to relevant competition effects. 
Hence, we expected them to be registered  more easily. Indeed, Regressions 13 and 14 
show that small projects have a significantly higher chance to be registered.  
Moreover, as expected, the potential de mand for certified em ission reductions 
affects EB decisions. If a buyer country’s Kyoto gap is large, i.e., its need for the CDM is 
high, its chances to have its projects registered by the EB increase. Finally, we look at the 
potential supply of certified emission reductions. The overall amount of CO2 emissions of 
a host country, which relates to the econom ic potential of the CDM, is also positively 
related to projects being registered. 
There is only one political-economic variable with a coefficient that contradicts 
our initial expectations. W e supposed that host country F DI inflow, indicating host 
country attractiveness f or investm ents, w ould affect project re gistration positively. 
However, we find a significant negative effect. Most plausibly, this can be explained by 
the relevance of the unilateral CDM. Unilateral CDM may open up new possibilities for 
countries willing to attract a higher share of international investment but not yet achieving 
this goal. A n example could be India where,  at the turn  of the century, FDI and trade 
involvement were relatively limited but which is opening up and can now make use of the 
unilateral CDM as some kind of a marketing tool to attract more FDI in the future.  
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Comparing the different regr ession specifications, the best  fit of the data to th e 
model is achieved in Regressions 13 and 14. In these regr essions, EB membership, the 
variables relating to the economic potential of projects, and the effective quality control 
variable explain EB decision making rather well. We are confident that these explanatory 
variables cover the most important determinants of EB decision making. Ramsey’s Reset 
testsv for the probit models in Table 4 are satisfactory. For all regressions, the squared 
predicted values are never significant (not even at the 10% level) while the plain predicted 
values are highly significant. Leaving out the politica l-economic varia bles, th e tes t 
indicates that important information is missing.  
Furthermore, we applied similar robustness checks to the regressions on projects as 
we did before to the regressions on methodologies. Controlling for unobserved 
heterogeneity via linear methodology fixed effects does not change the results. Neither do 
pre- or post- EB membership turn up significantly.  
Summing up our discussion of individual project decisions, we find non-negligible 
evidence for almost all of our initial political-economic hypotheses. Although results are 
not always significant in all relevant specifi cations and the size of the effects is often 
rather small, the overall picture provides a rather convincing evidence of the relevance of 
various stakeholder-related factors for EB decision m aking. Especially with respect to  
buyer country EB m embership, the results show  that individual projects are subject to 
political influence in general. In additi on, som e other relevant  political-econom ic 
variables could not even be in troduced into  o ur reg ression m odels as they perfectly 
predicted success.  
The overall picture of political-economic influence may be seen as more consistent 
here than in the context of EB decisions on methodologies. This in turn is in line with our 
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hypothesis that due to the lack of transpar ency for decisions on individual projects, 
political-economic factors matter more for EB decisions on individual projects than for 
decisions on methodologies. Obviously, given the high overal registration rates for CDM 
projects, the absolute value of the observed marginal effects is much lower for projects. 
Finally we observe that along with political-economic considerations, for projects just as 
for methodologies, the impact of quality on EB decisions is also very strong.  
5. Conclusions 
In this pape r, we set ou t to ex amine what determines decision m aking on the CDM 
Executive Board. Based on prior studies of decision making in international organizations, 
we considered that EB m embers maximize a weighted utility function of global and 
country specific costs and benefits. Theo retically, EB decisions should hence be 
influenced not only by the technical quali ty of the m ethodology or project under  
consideration, but also by the special interest of various stakeholders, which in turn seek 
the support of their country representatives. This led us to expect that membership on the 
EB should have a positive im pact on m ethodology approval and project registration. 
Furthermore, we expected that World Bank involvement would also raise the chances of 
acceptance. If methodologies are only beneficial for a few countries, we expected more 
politicized decisions and hence more divergence from reco mmendations by the 
Methodolology Panel. In turn, for sm all projects, for which there is  less scrutiny with 
respect to registration, higher chances of registration were expected. Turning to the stakes 
actually involved, more powerful countries and countries with high CDM potential were 
thought to be more successful in methodology approval and project registration. As there 
is less transparency in the assessm ent process of projects than  of m ethodologies, we 
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expected stronger results for all political-economic factors on the former. Finally, we 
argued that decisions should become stricter over time, as a certain number of effectively 
registered CDM projects were required to show that the whole mechanism might actually 
work.  
Based on our econom etric analysis on th e determinants of EB decision m aking 
over almost 1000 individual CDM projects and 250 methodologies, we find that the EB is 
strongly co mmitted to quality criteria. Recommendations by the Meth odology Panel 
explain a large part of EB methodology approval. Project qual ity is just as important a 
determinant for project registration by the EB. At the same time, our results suggest that a 
number of political-economic variables also drive outcomes of EB decision making.  
More specifically, we find that EB decisions tend to favor projects relevant for EB 
member countries. This is the case for both host and buyer countries, whereby the role of 
the latter is more clearly significant for project registration. For methodologies, only the 
host country influence is significant in the regressions presented here. However, this is 
partly driven by a high correlation between  host and buyer countries which m akes it 
difficult to disentangle these effects. While EB membership is generally highly relevant, 
consultancies (as opposed to investors) active in the CDM market do not seem to benefit 
from the influence of their country representatives.  
For projects and m ethodologies alike, the involvement of the W orld Bank as a 
powerful international player im proves the probability  of  success. In addition, as 
expected, we observe more divergence from  M eth panel recommendations for those 
methodologies which are relevant only for a limited number of countries. Moreover, 
project regressions clearly show that small projects are registered more easily, i.e., without 
much critical discussion.  
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There is mixed evidence for our hypothesis that countries for which the CDM has 
a high potential and countries which are generally powerful players have a higher chance 
to see their projects and methodologies accepted by the EB. For CDM projects we observe 
that host countries with a high overall level of CO2 emissions (and thus a high potential 
for CDM investments) are able to obtain registration for a higher share of their projects. 
At the same time, host FDI inflows  or other indicators of economic attractiveness and 
power do not improve the probability of projects being registered. For methodologies FDI 
inflows do not show the expected positive effect, either. On the contrary, it seems that to 
some extent CDM even substitutes for FDI. 
The effect of transparency of the decision-making process could not directly be 
tested, but there are some indications for its relevance when comparing the assessment 
process for projects and m ethodologies. In particular, pr oject registration rates are 
generally much higher than rates for methodology approval. However, political-economic 
considerations are clearly significant in both contexts and not substantially stronger in the 
less transparent decision-making process on individual projects.  
Finally, for both methodologies and projects, there is highly consistent evidence 
that EB decision making has become stricter over time – along with the increase in the 
stock of methodologies and projects already approved.  
As the EB is a rather new institution, its functioning may still be subject to change. 
This eventually leads us to reflect upon potential institutional improvements, which our 
analysis may suggest. First, it has to be recalled that the existing system seems to function 
rather well. This is the case because the predominant determinant of EB decisions appears 
to be quality. Nevertheless, the im pact of the p olitical-economic variab les is cle arly 
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significant. Let us consider the potential rele vance of these variab les in the contex t of 
institutional reform.  
Time dependency, in the sense that initially EB decision making tended to be less 
strict than in m ore recent tim es, does not seem to present any further problem  for t he 
future. Now that the CDM has become a widely used mechanism, no fall-back has to be 
expected.  
The influence of IOs and of other econo mic and EB membership variables can, 
however, give rise to some concern. With respect to methodologies, potential lobbying 
after initial decis ions for revision calls for further analysis. If necessary, institutional 
safeguards have to b e put in p lace to limit th e im pact of lobbying. An addition al 
recommendation for the procedure on registra tion of individual proj ects could be to 
increase transparency. This would also im ply a publica tion of  the initial scientif ic or  
technical assessments of the RIT. 
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Appendix A 
Annex 1: Rules on the transparency of EB decision making 
E. Transparency - Rule 26 
Subject to the need to protect confidential information, the principle of transparency 
should apply to all the work of the Executive Board, encompassing the timely public 
availability of documentation and channels through which external comments by all 
Parties and all UNFCCC accredited observers and stakeholders can be submitted for 
consideration by the Board. The posting of the Board’s meetings on the Internet is one 
way to ensure transparency. 
F. Attendance - Rule 27 
Paragraph 16 of the CDM modalities and procedures: 
1. Meetings of the Executive Board shall be open to attendance, as observers, by all 
Parties and by all UNFCCC accredited observers and stakeholders, except where 
otherwise decided by the Executive Board. 
2. In the context of paragraph 1 above, the Executive Board may decide, in the interest 
of economy and efficiency, to limit attendance at its meetings to members, alternate 
members and secretariat support staff. In such instances, the Executive Board shall 
take all practicable steps to accommodate in other ways the interests of Parties, non-
Parties to the Kyoto Protocol that are Parties to the Convention and accredited 
UNFCCC observers and stakeholders to observe its proceedings, except when the 
Executive Board decides to close all or a portion of a meeting. 
Source: UNFCCC 2006: Decision 4/CMP.1, Annex I, rules 26 and 27, p. 38.  
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Appendix B 
<insert tables 5 and 6 about here> 
Endnotes 
                                                 
i The potential influence of lobbying is further enh anced by the fact that additionality tests are far from 
straightforward. For e xample, proj ects can face politi cal or other barriers and m ay therefore not be 
implemented without the CDM despite looking financially attractive. As these barriers cannot always be 
monetized, t hey may not  be adequately considered. Figueres and Bosi (2006) discuss t he p roblem of  
political barriers through the example of lighting projects. Major problems in this context are in particular 
distorted (i.e., low) electricity prices and poor recovery of cost, which taken together destroy any incentives 
for the consumer to buy more efficient light bulbs.  
ii To date, a formal vote has only been made twice in the seven-year history of the EB. 
iii In two exceptional cases, the initial Meth Panel recommendation is indecisive between B and C. We 
code these cases as 0.5. 
iv Only the coefficient of the constant is very high. However, this is simply a result of the range of the “year” 
variable.  
v In the basic version of Ramsey’s Reset test which is used here, the dependent variable is regressed on its 
own predicted values from the main regression and their squares. If the initial model is well specified, the 
coefficient of the predicted values should be highly significant, while the square term should not contain any 
additional information and thus be insignificant. 
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Tables 
Table 1: EB decision making outcomes for projects and methodologies until 10/2007 
Methodologies Projects 
Approval dummy Approval categories Registration dummy Registration categories
Approval (1) 107 
(45%) 
Immediate 
approval (2) 
47 
(19.8%)
OoRegistration (1) 824 
(94.2%) 
Registration (4) 824 
(84.5%)
  Approval after 
revision (1) 
60 
(25.2%)
  Request for 
review (3) 
47 
(4.8%)
      Correction 
request (2) 
45 
(4.6%)
      Under review 
(1) 
8   
(0.8%)
Rejection or 
withdrawal (0) 
131 
(55%) 
Rejection or 
withdrawal (0) 
131 
(55%) 
OoRejection or 
Oowithdrawal (0) 
51  
(5.8%) 
Rejection or 
withdrawal (0) 
51 
(5.2%)
Total 238 
(100%)
 238 
(100%)
 875 
(100%) 
 975 
(100%)
Note: As opposed to the total number of projects and methodologies stated at the beginning of this 
section, this table shows only observations for which all necessary information on explanatory variables 
is available for the subsequent econometric analysis. This leads to the exclusion of one methodology and 
ten projects. 
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Table 2: Determinants of methodology approval by the CDM Executive Board 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6 ) (7 ) 
 Prob it Probit Probit Probit Prob it Prob it Prob it 
 EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
EB 
approval 
yes/no 
4.87***       Final Meth Panel 
recommendation  (0.00)       
 3.03*** 3.07*** 3.05*** 3. 04*** 3. 07*** 3. 05*** Initial Meth Panel 
recommendation  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0 .00) (0 .00) (0 .00) 
0.31 0. 58**  0.43 0.58**  0.45 Host country is EB 
member or alternate (0.17) (0.01)  (0.13) (0.02)  (0.15) 
0.14  0.52 0.22  0.51 0.20 Buyer country is EB 
member or alternate (0.63)  (0.12) (0.59)  (0.12) (0.64) 
0.14 -0.47 -0.47 -0.51 -0 .48 -0 .47 -0 .52 Consultant country is EB 
member or alternate (0.69) (0.14) (0.14) (0.12) (0 .14) (0 .14) (0 .12) 
0.45 0.87** 0.92** 0.89** 0.90*** 0. 93*** 0. 91*** Consultant is an 
international 
organization 
(0.47) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0 .01) (0 .01) (0 .01) 
-0.37*** -0.25** -0.26** -0.25** -0 .24** -0 .26** -0 .24** Year of decisive EB 
decision (0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0 .04) (0 .03) (0 .05) 
    -0.01 -0 .01 -0 .01 FDI, net inflows into 
host country  
(2000, % of GDP) 
    (0.92) (0 .95) (0 .94) 
    0.00 0. 00 0. 00 FDI, net outflows from 
buyer country 
(2000, % of GDP) 
    (0.75) (0 .98) (0 .85) 
738.95*** 490.36** 516.53** 501.47** 4 68.93** 5 19.55** 4 87.41** Constant 
(0.00) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0 .04) (0 .03) (0 .05) 
        
Observations 218 238 238 238 23 8 23 8 23 8 
Log pseudolikelihood -14.16 -50.17 -50.60 -50.03 -5 0.12 -5 0.60 -5 0.01 
Wald χ² 186.53 62.35 69.76 81.54 158.73 18 3.03 18 9.46 
Prob > Wald χ² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0. 00 0. 00 0. 00 
Pseudo R-Square 0.91 0.69 0.69 0.69 0. 69 0. 69 0. 69 
Area under ROC curve 0.99 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 
Notes: P-values in parentheses (adjusted for host country clusters). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
The Receiver-Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve jointly depicts t he fraction of correctly identified 
positive values (approvals) and the fraction of correctly identified zero-values (rejections) for different 
cutoff points. The cutoff point specifies the minimum probability for a prediction of EB approval = 1 (See, 
for example, StataCorp 2005, p. 85). 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Final Meth Panel recommendation versus EB decision 
 EB decision 
Methpanel recommendation No Yes Total 
No 122 1 123 
Yes 2 93 95 
Total 12 4 94 218 
 
Table 4: Determinants of project registration by the CDM Executive Board 
 (8) (9)+ (10)+ (11) (12)+ (13)+ (14) 
 Probi Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit 
 EB final decision
yes/no 
EB final decision 
yes/no 
EB final decision
yes/no 
EB final decision 
yes/no 
EB final decision
yes/no 
EB final decision
yes/no 
EB final decision
yes/no 
0.00    0.02/0.000 0.01/0.000 0.01 Host country tertiary enrolment 
(2000, % gross) (0.93)    (0.14) (0.19) (0.25) 
 0.81/0.013*** 0.87/0.017*** 0.87*** 1.01/0.005*** 0.99/0.007*** 0.99*** Project quality 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
-0.60 0.90/0.037***  0.00 0.40/0.003  -0.00 Host country is EB member or 
alternate (0.125) (0.00)  (0.99) (0.21)  (0.99) 
0.74**  1.24/0.054*** 1.25***  0.79/0.009*** 0.79*** Buyer country is EB member or 
alternate (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00)  (0.00) (0.00) 
-0.44*** -0.72/-0.018*** -0.64/-0.012** -0.64*** -0.90/-0.005** -0.77/-0.005*** -0.77** Year of EB decision 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) 
    0.43/0.002 0.50/0.003* 0.50* Small project 
     (0.18) (0.09) (0.09) 
    0.00/0.000*** 0.00/0.000*** 0.00*** Kyoto gap (predicted, 2008-2012, 
million t CO2 eq.)     (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
    0.02/0.000** 0.01/0.000 0.01 FDI, net outflows from buyer 
country (2000, % of GDP)     (0.036) (0.37) (0.32) 
    -0.13/-0.001*** -0.09/-0.001*** -0.09** FDI, net inflows into host country 
(2000, % of GDP)     (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) 
    0.00/0.000*** 0.00/0.000*** 0.00*** Host country CO2 emissions 2000 
(kt)      (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
888.38*** 1,444.96*** 1,276.66** 1,276.98*** 1797.97** 1551.81*** 1551.45** Constant 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
        
Observations 875 875 875 875 875 875 875 
Log pseudolikelihood -180.79 -139.57 -129.33 -123.85 -115.02 -112.19 -112.19 
Wald χ² 20.73 31.35 98.73 102.92  344.02  
Prob > Wald χ² 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00  
Pseudo R-Square 0.07 0.28 0.33 0.33 0.41 0.42 0.42 
Area under ROC curve 0.65 0.87 0.90 0.91 0.93 0.94 0.94 
Notes: P-values in parentheses (adjusted for host country clusters). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. + For Regressions 9–10 and 12-
13 marginal effects, evaluated at the mean of the explanatory variables, are presented in addition to coefficient estimates. For the variables “Host country is EB 
member or alternate”, “Buyer country is EB member/alternate or IO” and “Small project” dF/dx stands for the discrete change of the dummy variable from 0 to 1. 
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Table 5: Short description and summary statistics of most important variables for Methodologies 
Variable Additional Description Mean S.D. Median Lower Upper Source 
        
EB approval yes/no Approval by EB: 0 - no or withdrawn , 1 - approved  0.45 0.50 0 0 1 URC (2007) 
        
Year of decisive EB 
decision    2005 2003 2007 URC (2007) 
Final Meth Panel 
recommendation 
Recommendation  by Meth Panel: 0 -  C ,  1 - A 
(decisive decision) 0.44 0.50 0 0 1 UNFCCC (2007d) 
Initial Meth Panel 
recommendation 
Mark of initial Meth Panel assessment: 0 - C , 0.5 - 
B/C , 1 - B , 2 - A 0.82 0.80 1 0 2 UNFCCC (2007d) 
Host country is EB 
member or alternate  0.47 0.50 0 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007a) 
Buyer country is EB 
member or alternate  0.22 0.42 0 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007a) 
Consultant country is EB 
member or alternate  0.42 0.49 0 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007a) 
Consultant is an 
international organization  0.07 0.25 0 0 1 URC (2007) 
FDI, net inflows into host 
country host country net FDI inflows in % of GDP (2000) 2.91 2.21 2.86 -2.76 9.86 World Bank  (2006) 
FDI, net outflows from 
buyer country buyer country net FDI outflows in % of GDP (2000) 3.54 6.80 0 0 20.10 World Bank  (2006) 
marks by Meth Panel 
Recommendations: A- approval , B - changes 
required , C - new PDD shall be submitted       
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007d) 
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Table 6: Short description and summary statistics of most important variables for Projects 
Variable Additional Description Mean S.D. Median Lower Upper Source 
        
EB final decision yes/no 
Registration by EB: 0 - not registered or withdrawn 
, 1 - registered 0.94 0.23 1 0 1 URC (2007) 
        
Green House Gas 
reduction 
Green House Gas reductions of project in ktCO2 
equivalent reductions per year 196.90 843.51 38 0.6 10437 URC (2007) 
Small project dummy for small project 0.48 0.50 0 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007b) 
Year of EB decision year of decisive EB decision   2006 2004 2007 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007b) 
project quality 
external assessment of project quality: 1 - lowest , 5 
- highest  3.01 1.42 3 1 5 External Assessment 
Host country is EB 
member or alternate  0.63 0.48 1 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007a) 
Buyer country is EB 
member or alternate  0.18 0.39 0 0 1 
URC (2007) & 
UNFCCC (2007a) 
FDI, net inflows into host 
country host country net FDI inflows in % of GDP (2000) 2.67 2.01 2.94 -2.76 9.86 World Bank  (2006) 
FDI, net outflows from 
buyer country 
buyer country net FDI outflows in % of GDP 
(2000) 7.79 8.44 0.66 0 20.1 World Bank  (2006) 
Host tertiary enrollment host country gross tertiary enrollment rate (2000) 16.23 11.84 10.20 0.13 72.60 World Bank  (2006) 
Host  CO2 emissions host country CO2 emission in kt (2000) 928039 880186 1158641 161.22 2767397 World Bank  (2006) 
Kyoto gap  
buyer country target gap to Kyoto protocol 
promises in million t CO2 equivalent 40.95 281.09 0 -243 1260 
EEA (2006), U.S. Dep. 
of Energy (2007), 
UNFCCC (2007c) 
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